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SUE DAVIS 
In the early 1970's I began graduate school with an extremely vague 
expectation that I would like to study some combination of constitutional law 
and political theory. I can remember well my feelings of confusion when I 
was told that "public law" was a declining and marginal area of political sci-
ence. Moreover, much of public law appeared to consist of counting judges' 
votes, assigning "scores" and of Bloc Analysis and Guttman Scales rather 
than "traditional" doctrinal analysis. I recollect hearing (or perhaps reading) 
that when political scientists engaged in "traditional" analysis they were un-
necessarily duplicating the scholarship produced by law professors. 1 C. Her-
man Pritchett's teaching and Walter F. Murphy's articles on constitutinal 
interpretation in the late 1970's 2 provided much needed reassurance and 
encouragement. Still, a number of years later the advice of several anony-
mous manuscript reviewers to the effect that my articles "would be more 
appropriate for a law journal" served to increase my doubts about the role 
of constitutional scholarship in the discipline of Political Science. 
Fortunately, the times are changing. Both the quantity and quality of 
scholarship by political scientists during the last few years suggests that 
constitutional theory is in the process of resuming a prominent position 
within the discipline. For example, Walter F. Murphy, William F. Harris III, 
and James E. Fleming have recently published an extraordinary casebook.3 
A number of important works on the role of the Supreme Court and consti-
tutional interpretation have been written by political scientists including Soti-
rios Barber, 4 Lief Carter, 5 and John Agresto . 6 Two of the three works 
discussed in this essay were authored by political scientists. Moreover, 
some of the political science journals have become more amenable to pub-
lishing articles on constitutional theory. 
The bicentennial of the Constitution (which constitutional scholars have 
been celebrating for at least two years) has enhanced political scientists' in-
terest in constitutional theory. Additionally, the recent speeches by Attor-
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ney General Edwin Meese have not only encouraged the academic debate 
regarding constitutional interpretation and the role of the Supreme Court 
but, by demonstrating that the debate is not "merely" academic, have cap-
tured the attention of millions of Americans. 
The discourse regarding the Constitution revolves around three ques-
tions: What is the nature of the Constitution? How should it be interpreted? 
And who should do the interpreting - does the Supreme Court have the fi-
nal say in resolving constitutional questions? 7 The books discussed here are 
concerned with all three of the questions; the central issue upon which they 
converge, however , is that of constitutional interpretation. 
Interpretive methods have been organized and labeled and then reorga-
nized and re-labeled. The literature on the subject is voluminous. 8 Briefly 
(and over-simplistically), one mode of interpretation searches for the mean-
ing of the Constitution by ascertaining the intentions of those who adopted 
it. This mode has been labeled variously as "interpretivism," "intentional-
ism," "originalism," "textualism," "preservativism, " and "positivism''. An 
opposing mode of interpretation searches for constitutional meaning by iden-
tifying values that are essential to modern society and therefore perceived 
to be in the "spirit" of the Constitution. This mode is known variously as 
"noninterpretivism," "supplementalism", "nonoriginalism", "rejectionism," 
and "structuralism". Whereas the first mode purports to remain faithful to 
the words of the text, the second reaches beyond the four corners of the 
document for constitutional meaning. Also, the first mode presupposes that 
the the meaning of the Constitution, determined by its adopters, is fixed and 
unchanging. The second is more consistent with the notion that the Consti-
tution's meaning evolves in order to keep pace with the values and demands 
of modern society. 
To speak of only two modes of interpretation is grossly misleading be-
cause there are many more than two ways to interpret. 9 For example, it is 
possible to use the intent of the framers as a basis for discerning the mean-
ing of the Constitutional meaning without attempting to discover their spe-
cific intent in particular clauses. One might, instead, attempt to discover a 
more general intent of the framers in light of the dominant political ideas of 
their time. Thus, the interpreter might appeal to the spirit rather than the 
letter of the Constitution but with reference to the intent of the framers 
rather than to contemporary values. A distinction must therefore be made 
between "general intentionalism" and "specific intentionalism" 10 
For the purposes of the present discussion the crucial issue in interpre-
tation is, to what extent should one rely on the framers as a source of au-
thority for understanding the meaning of the Constitution? The authors of 
the three the books discussed in this essay are committed to what I have 
called "general intentionalism". 
According to Gary J. Jacobsohn, who is a political science professor at 
Williams College, an understanding of the political-legal theories that in-
formed the framing and early development of the Constitution provides the 
key to its proper interpretation. The theme of The Supreme Court and the 
Decline of Constitutional Aspiration is that the natural rights tradition, which 
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occupied a central position in the early constitutional experience, has been 
abandoned by modem constitutional theory. 
In regard to the question of how the Constitution should be interpreted 
Jacobsohn has staked out a middle ground between the "specific intentional-
ists" and those who search outside the document for principles of justice. 
Jacobsohn finds his middle ground in the notion that principles of natural jus-
tice are not external to the Constitution; they are instead, contained within 
it. 
As his title suggests, Jacobsohn views the abandonment of natural 
rights doctrine as a major problem in modem constitutional interpretation -
a "decline" in constitutional theory. He calls for a return to constitutional as-
piration, which will consist of "an effort by judges to retrieve, where rele-
vant, the constitutional aspirations of the framers" 11 as a guide to 
interpreting, understanding and applying our fundamental law. 
In separate chapters (some of which have been previously published in 
political science journals) Jacobsohn examines the theories of Roscoe Pound, 
Ronald Dworkin, Raoul Berger, Thomas Grey, and John Hart Ely. He con-
trasts their theories with those of the men who played leading roles in shap-
ing the Constitution, including James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John 
Marshall, and Abraham Lincoln in order to demonstrate the modem rejec-
tion of the natural rights tradition. 
Jacobsohn effectively contrasts the old and the new constitutional the-
ory in an early chapter by placing Roscoe Pound's notion of law (a science 
created by society for the purpose of realizing social interests and protecting 
social relations) alongside the eighteenth century conception of the law 
(based on self-evident truths). Pound, Jacobsohn explains, embraced a utili-
tarian "good" as what most people wanted at any given time, whereas 
James Madison envisioned a community with permanent interests separate 
from the totality of group interests. Pound's legal theory also revised the 
role of judge from the framers idea that judges would be guardians who 
would protect permanent legal-political principles to social engineers who 
would recognize that rights vary with changing mores and values. 
Jacobsohn further demonstrates the departure of modem theory from 
the natural rights orientation of the eighteenth century in a critique of Ron-
ald Dworkin's jurisprudence. Dworkin's divergence from earlier constitu-
tional theory, Jacobsohn notes, can be found in part in his view of the 
Constitution as countermajoritarian and the consequent need for an activist, 
rights-oriented Supreme Court. For Madison, in contrast, the Constitution 
was a majoritarian document that built protection of minorities into the politi-
cal process. Jacobsohn argues further that Dworkin's theory has also di-
verged from that of the framers in its substitution of moral philosophy for 
the intent of the framers. Dworkin has made the Constitution an "object of 
transvaluation" 12 by focusing on the fundamental right to equality and has, 
moreover, effected a transvaluation of the function of the judiciary by requir-
ing the Court to quarantee that equality. 
Although Jacobsohn does not attempt to refute Raoul Berger's "specific 
intentionalist" approach to constitutional interpretation, he does seek to 
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demonstrate that the Constitution is not the positivistic document that Ber-
ger presents. Berger's portrayal of the Constitution, Jacobsohn asserts, is 
based on a misconstrual of the ideas of Alexander Hamilton, who "would 
have been comfortable with the implication that the Constitution incorpo-
rates immutable principles of natural justice within the confines of its posi-
tive law." 13 
Raoul Berger argues that the natural rights tradition is irrelevant to 
constitutional interpretation. By contrast, Thomas Grey has claimed that the 
natural rights tradition of the eighteenth century created a set of legally bid-
ing principles that judges could utilize as an unwritten constitution, supple-
mentary to the written one. It is in this context that Jacobsohn most 
effectively illustrates his middle ground. In his view, the written Constitu-
tion was meant to embody commitment of the framers to the natural rights: 
Therefore, judicial appeals to "higher law" are not 
justifiable when they lead to a distinction between written 
and unwritten constitutions, but they are justifiable insofar 
as they help explicate and illuminate the written words of 
the Constitution itself. 14 
Jacobsohn's argument, to be successful, requires at least the following. 
First, he must persuade the reader that the natural rights tradition, was indeed 
central to the ideas of the men who shaped the Constitution. Second, he needs 
to demonstrate the modem rejection of that tradition. Finally, he needs to 
demonstrate the need to return to the natural rights tradition of the framers. 
Jacobsohn's method of drawing sharp contrasts between old and new consti-
tutional thought is an effective means of fulfilling the first two requirements. 
His failure to fulfill the third requirement is the major shortcoming of the book. 
Jacobsohn neglects to provide a justification for relying on the political theory 
of the eighteenth century for our understanding of the Constitution. Indeed, 
he treats the authority of the framers as a settled issue in constitutional inter-
pretation. 
If the Supreme Court were to adopt Jacobsohn's view of the Constitution, 
how would it resolve the current disputes over such issues as the exclusionary 
rule, capital punishment, abortion, and the application of the Bill of Rights to 
the states? To be sure, judges who appeal to principles of natural law would 
not be considered to be abusing their discretion because they would remain 
faithful to the framers intent. Jacobsohn, however, declines to enter the realm 
of particular issues. He goes only so far as to assert that the application of his 
natural rights Constitution would involve an orientation "that expresses a broad 
commitment to the type of polity the Constitution aspires to have." 15 
Jacobsohn contends that his Constitution, properly understood, provides 
the intellectual context for finding what is permanent in our fundamental law. 
But questions of the way that Constitution would apply to particular cases 
remain unanswered. In short, even if we accept Jacobsohn's assertion that the 
legal theories of the eighteenth century should serve as a guide to interpreting 
the Constitution today, we are left with little insight into what that actually 
means. 
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Christopher Wolfe's The Rise of Modem Judicial Review is a lengthy 
history of the Supreme Court's view of its function as interpreter of the Con-
stitution. His thesis is that the judicial function and the nature of constitutional 
interpretation have undergone a profound transformation. The judiciary now 
exercises judicial "will" rather than "merely judgment" 16 and has usurped 
legislative power. Like Jacobsohn, Wolfe perceives the change from old the-
ories and practices to new as an unwelcome and unfortunate deterioration of 
the original understanding of the nature of the Constitution, how it should be 
interpreted, and who should do the interpreting. 
Wolfe, who teaches political science at Marquette University, divides the 
history of judicial review into three eras. He portrays the first, the era of 
traditional or moderate judicial review from 1789 unW 1890, as a time when 
there was major agreement on the principles of constitutional interpretation. 
During the traditional era, according to Wolfe, justices usually followed the 
rules of interpretation provided by Sir William Blackstone in his Commenta-
taries on the Laws of England published in 1770 utilizing the five basic signs: 
"the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequences, 
or the spirit and reason of the law." 17 According to Wolfe, such rules were 
so widely accepted by American lawyers at the time of the framing that the 
issue of interpretation was not discussed . Wolfe asserts that Chief Justice John 
Marshall followed those rules in his decisions that were so crucial to the 
development of judicial and congressional power. 
While the traditional era was dominated by John Marshall's correct un-
derstanding of the Constitution, during the second era, which lasted until 1937, 
judges began to depart from early principles of interpretation and to expand 
the role of the judiciary. The transitional era was dominated by judicial activism 
to overturn legislative attempts to regulate business. Still, the justices contin-
ued to relate their decisions to particular provisions in the Constitution. More-
over, during the transitional era judges' "self-understanding" allowed them to 
maintain a belief that they were adhering to the original principles of judicial 
review. 
In the third, or modern era the judiciary has expanded constitutional 
provisions beyond all recognition. Locating the roots of the transformation in 
legal realism, Wolfe argues that the realists were mistaken in their attempt to 
dispel the myth of mechanical jurisprudence. Judges, at least during the tra-
ditional era, did not base their decisions on extra-legal factors but rather on 
widely accepted principles of interpretation. Indeed, Chief Justice John Marshall 
was faithful to the original intent of the Constitution. Thus, Wolfe places the 
responsibility for the transformation of judicial review on the legal realists who 
suggested that judges did not merely discover the law but created it out of 
their own experience. 
Wolfe urges a return to a traditional judicial review that would result in a 
Constitution "fairly interpreted to faithfully express the meaning it was given 
by its authors and understood by those who gave it authority by ratifying it." 18 
He urges us to reexamine our foundations, to renew our acquaintance with 
the political philosophy of the men who established the Constitution, so that 
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we may appreciate and understand it and apply their approach to constitutional 
interpretation. 
The Rise of Modem Judicial Review fills 356 pages. One of the reasons 
the book is disappointing is that a major portion of it consists of familiar case 
analysis of little value to any reader who has read even one general book on 
the history of the Supreme Court. It is not clear for whom the book is intended. 
While academic readers will be annoyed when they encounter an outline of the 
Bill of Rights, only the most patient undergraduates will be willing to wade 
through all the material that the book includes. 
There are, however , more serious substantive problems with the book. 
Cut to the essentials, Wolfe's thesis consists of the following assertions: 
l. The proper method of interpretating the Constitution consists of ap-
plying rules of interpretation that keep it faithful to the intent of the framers. 
2. That method was dominate until 1890. 
3. Chief Justice Marshall did not take a position in favor of judicial su-
premacy but rather in favor of constitutional supremacy . 
4. The traditional approach should serve as a model for modem consti-
tutional review. 
The reader needs to be persuaded that the first assertion is true before 
the argument can proceed. Wolfe, unfortunately, does very little to explain 
exactly why it is that the principles of interpretation he urges are the proper 
ones. We are essentially told only that they are proper because the were the 
original principles. His attempt to demonstrate that those principles were, 
indeed, the original ones over and that there was very little disagreement over 
them is, moreover , unconvincing. Thus Wolfe fails to secure the foundation 
for his indictment of modem judicial review. 
It may be that modem readers (including this reviewer) have so thoroughly 
absorbed legal realism that we cannot believe that John Marshall did not engage 
in some creating of law. Perhaps our experience with the post-1937 Court has 
imbued us with a devotion to the idea that the judiciary should protect personal 
rights. We may, in short, have so thoroughly departed from our original judicial 
tradition that we can no longer even believe in it. It is possible that traditional 
judicial review was proper and its modem version is an aberration. Neverthe-
less, for this reviewer Wolfe's contention that judicial review in the nineteenth 
century was fundamentally different and superior to what the Supreme Court 
has been doing since 1937 borders on the incredible. 
Wolfe's portrayal of John Marshall as a judge who, unlike modem jurists, 
was faithful to the established principles of constitutional interpretation and 
indeed to the original meaning of the Constitution is appealing but ultimately 
unconvincing. Wolfe's analysis of modem judicial review, however, is not even 
appealing. It is, in fact, predictable and stale. For example, Wolfe says of the 
Court's's decision in Craig v Boren (striking down on equal protection grounds 
an Oklahoma law that allowed 21 year old males and 18 year old females to 
purchase beer): "The Court ... was striking down the law under the influence 
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of elite intellectual hostility to the notion of important sex differences that are 
legally cognizable." 19 Moreover, his comparison of Roe v Wade to Dred Scott 
can only be described as offensive: 
In each case major support for the Court came from 
"pro-choice" sentiment ("popular sovereignty" in regard 
to slavery and the territories, a women's "right to privacy") 
in regard to abortion. 20 
Such inappropriate comparisons add nothing to the serious debate re-
garding the constitutional right to privacy. 
Michael Kent Curtis' No State Shall Abridge provides a much more specific 
treatment of constitutional interpretation than either of the other two works 
reviewed here. Rather than advocate an approach to interpreting the Consti-
tution, Curtis simply applies his method and does the interpreting himself. 
Curtis, an attorney for a Greensboro, North Carolina law firm, presents the 
thesis that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to make the 
Bill of Rights applicable to the states . 
Curtis's method of discerning the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is to examine the intent of the framers "in light of the anti-slavery crusade 
that produced" the Amendment. Although the intent of the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment has been thoroughly examined numerous times, 21 Cur-
tis offers some fresh insight by including in the framework of his analysis 
principles of Republican constitutional theory. These include the Republican 
convictions that the Thirteenth Amendment made blacks citizens; that the Bill 
of Rights applied to the states before the Fourteenth Amendment; that the 
Privileges and Immunities of Article IV of the Constitution protected funda-
mental rights against state action; and that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment protected people from enslavement in Washington, D.C. 
In order to take Republican theory into account, Curtis extends his ex-
amination of the historical materials beyond the debates on the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the congressional debates on the Thirteenth Amendment, on 
Reconstruction, and the Civil Rights Bill. He also avoids one of the pitfalls of 
"intentionalism" by defining, at the outset, "the framers" as the proponents 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, primarily the Republicans who were members 
of the committee that reported the Amendment to Congress such as Repre-
sentative John Bingham, the author of the Amendment, and Senator Jacob 
Howard who managed the Amendment in the Senate . 
No State Shall Abridge considers many questions about the Fourteenth 
Amendment that have been addressed previously, including the relationship 
between the Civil Rights Bill and the Amendment, Bingham's understanding 
of the law at the time including his understanding of the privileges or immunities 
clause of Article IV, what Bingham meant when he referred to the Bill of 
Rights, and the significance of the change in language from Bingham's initial 
proposal. 22 
Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger, who both argued that the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to make the Bill of Rights applicable 
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to the states, are Curtis' prime targets. For example, Curtis rejects Fainnan's 
assessment of Bingham. According to Curtis, Bingham was not confused about 
the law and and did not mistakenly believe that the Bill of Rights already applied 
to the states; he was, in Curtis' judgment, well aware of Barron v Baltimore 
but strongly disagreed with it. Additionally, Curtis refutes the argument that 
because the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment said very little about the 
applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states they did not intend it to apply. 
He offers the alternative explanation that they did not discuss the issue at 
length because they assumed the Bill of Rights would apply, which certainly 
makes sense if they believed that it should apply. 
Curtis' argument is appealing and clearly more convincing than that of 
either Fairman or Berger. Curtis' research is careful and thorough. He is 
innocent of the misleading omissions in his selective quotations such as those 
that can be found in Berger's Government by Judiciary. 23 Curtis makes sense 
out of the statements of the proponents of the Amendments, in contrast to 
both Berger and Fairman who contended that leading Republicans were con-
fused and muddled about the Jaw and that their statements , therefore, should 
not be taken seriously. With his careful analysis Curtis provides a valuable 
rejoinder to those who argue that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not intend to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. 
The shortcoming of No State Shall Abridge is that it fails to provide a 
compelling justification for its method. Curtis makes no effort to overcome the 
numerous objections to "intentionalism". One problem with that mode of inter-
pretation in general and with Curtis' analysis in particular is that an examination 
of the statements made by framers leads - apparantly unavoidably - to 
second-guessing and psychologizing. For example, what did Senator Howard 
really mean when he asserted that the privileges (of Article IV) should include 
"the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the 
first eight amendments to the Constitution; such as" free -
dom of speech and press , the right to assemble, the right 
to bear arms, not to have troops quartered in private 
homes during peacetime, to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures and from unreasonable bail, to be 
tried by an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature of 
an accusation, and to be free from cruel and unusual pun-
ishments . 24 
Did "such as" mean "illustrative of the all of the Bill of Rights"? Or did it 
mean "here is a list of all the rights that are applicable"? What did he really 
mean? Who can ever say for certain? Walter F. Murphy wrote in 1978 that 
"the difficulties that confront any painstakingly thorough and intellectually scru-
pulous researcher who tries to establish legislative intent are typically insu-
perable." 25 
In that same article Murphy suggested that the framers probably did not 
intend "their specific interpretations of the sweeping language they used to 
bind future generations. They would have recognized that the future would 
bring problems that the framers had never encountered or foreseen." 26 H. 
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Jefferson Powell has elaborated on the same objection in a recent article in 
which he argues persuasively that the framers did not believe that examination 
of the intent of specific individuals was an appropriate method of interpreting 
the Constitution. 27 Curtis would have done well to address such problems. 
Jacobsohn, Wolfe, and Curtis all simply assume that "intentionalism" is 
the proper mode of interpreting the Constitution; thus, none of them seem to 
perceive a need to provide a compelling justification for it. The arguments for 
"intentionalism" most often include the following. The Constitution is the su-
preme law of the land; "intentionalism" will not only enable us to keep our 
commitment to that supreme law but it will also assure consistency in its 
meaning. "Intentionalism" is consistent with the institutional arrangements 
provided in the Constitution insofar as it limits the activity of the judiciary, and 
thereby allows more room for the political process to function in a democratic 
manner. Judicial power is not legitimate unless judges adhere to the intent of 
the framers and thereby eliminate the possibility of imposing their own values 
on constitutional decisions. The framers were correct in their vision of repub-
lican government; thus, modem interpretation must not deviate from that 
vision. The framers intended that future interpreters would rely on their intent. 
All three of the authors discussed here treat the argument for "inten-
tionalism" as settled when, in actuality, it is at the center of an intense debate. 
Lief Carter has affirmed the intensity of the debate by asserting that, "The 
case for constitutional interpretation bound strictly to text and history is only 
slightly stronger than the case for the proposition that we inhabit a flat earth." 28 
Each of the three works discussed here provides a significant contribution 
to the discourse concerning the nature of the Constitution, how it should be 
interpreted, and who should interpret it. Still, it is important to note that 
Jacobsohn, Wolfe, and Curtis represent only one side of multifaceted discourse. 
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